



Honorable Mike K. Nakagawa  
United States Bankruptcy Judge



Entered on Docket  
June 10, 2019

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

\* \* \* \* \*

In re:	)	Case No.: 10-26698-MKN
	)	Chapter 7
JUSTIN DAVID WARD and	)	
AUTUMN BETH WARD,	)	
	)	Date: June 5, 2019
Debtors.	)	Time: 2:30 p.m.
	)	

**ORDER ON PARADISE HARBOUR PLACE TRUST AND VENDANGE PLACE TRUST’S MOTION TO RETROACTIVELY ANNUL THE AUTOMATIC STAY<sup>1</sup>**

On June 5, 2019, the court heard Paradise Harbor Place Trust and Vendange Place Trust’s Motion to Retroactively Annul the Automatic Stay (“Annulment Motion”). The appearances of counsel were noted on the record. After arguments were presented, the matter was taken under submission.

**BACKGROUND**

On September 1, 2010, Justice David Ward and Autumn Beth Ward (“Debtors”) filed a voluntary, joint Chapter 7 petition (“Petition”), along with their schedules of assets and liabilities (“Schedules”), statement of financial affairs (“SOFA”), and Chapter 7 individual debtor’s statement of intention (“Statement of Intention”). (ECF No. 1). On the Petition, Debtors listed

<sup>1</sup> In this Order, all references to “ECF No.” are to the number assigned to the documents filed in the case as they appear on the docket maintained by the clerk of court. All references to “Section” are to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. All references to “NRS” are to provisions of the Nevada Revised Statutes. All references to “FRE” are to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

1 their residence as 2601 Vendange Place, Henderson, Nevada 89044 (“Residence”). The case  
2 was assigned for administration to Joseph B. Atkins as Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee (“Trustee”).

3 On their Schedule “A”, Debtors listed the Residence as having a value of \$266,000. On  
4 their Schedule “C”, Debtors did not claim an exemption in the Residence. On their Schedule  
5 “D,” Debtors listed the Residence as being subject to liens in favor of Bank of America Home  
6 Loans (“BOA”), the City of Henderson, and Madeira Canyon, c/o Associated Professional  
7 Services.<sup>2</sup> On their Statement of Intention, Debtors reiterated that the Residence is subject to  
8 liens identified on Schedule “D” and that the Residence will be surrendered.

9 On the same date the Petition was filed, a Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting  
10 of Creditors, and Deadlines (“Bankruptcy Notice”) was filed and served on all parties in interest.  
11 (ECF No. 7).

12 On September 4, 2010, a Certificate of Notice was filed attesting that the Bankruptcy  
13 Notice was sent by first class mail and by electronic transmission to various parties. (ECF No.  
14 9). BOA and Madeira HOA are included on the certificate, but not the Movants.

15 On December 7, 2010, Debtors received their Chapter 7 discharge (“Discharge Order”).  
16 (ECF No. 20).

17 On December 9, 2010, a Certificate of Notice was filed attesting that the Discharge Order  
18 was sent by first class mail and by electronic transmission to various parties. (ECF No. 21).  
19 BOA and Madeira HOA are included on the certificate, but not the Movants.

20 On September 1, 2011, Debtors filed a notice that they had changed their address to 1502  
21 W. Horseshoe Bend in Rochester Hills, Michigan. (ECF No. 33).

22 On January 27, 2012, the Trustee filed a notice of his final report and request for  
23 compensation (“TFR”), and of the deadline for filing objections. (ECF No. 36).

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27 <sup>2</sup> Madeira Canyon is a homeowners association (“HOA”) encompassing the area in which  
28 the Residence is situated. Hereafter, the Madeira Canyon homeowners association will be  
referred to as “Madeira HOA.”

1 On February 1, 2012, a Certificate of Notice was filed attesting that the TFR was sent by  
2 first class mail and by electronic transmission to various parties. (ECF No. 37). BOA and  
3 Madeira HOA are included on the certificate, but not the Movants.

4 On February 28, 2012, an order was entered approving the final report. (ECF No. 39).

5 On May 22, 2012, a final decree was entered discharging the Trustee from any further  
6 duties and closing the case.<sup>3</sup> (ECF No. 41).

7 On April 30, 2019, an order was entered granting an ex parte request to reopen the  
8 bankruptcy case. (ECF No. 44).

9 On May 1, 2019, the instant Annulment Motion<sup>4</sup> was filed by Paradise Harbor Place  
10 Trust (“Paradise Harbor”) and Vendange Place Trust (“Vendange Place”) [collectively  
11 “Movants”]. (ECF No. 46).

12 On May 22, 2019, opposition was filed on behalf of BOA (“Opposition”) accompanied  
13 by the Declaration of Jamie Combs (“Combs Declaration”).<sup>5</sup> (ECF Nos. 50 and 51).<sup>6</sup>

14 On May 31, 2019, Movants filed a reply (“Reply”).<sup>7</sup> (ECF No. 53).

### 15 THE PRESENT DISPUTE

16 During the Chapter 7 case, Madeira HOA recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien  
17 with respect to the Residence. Thereafter, it recorded a notice of default and election to sell the  
18 Residence. It then recorded a notice of sale. Madeira HOA took these actions without obtaining  
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20 <sup>3</sup> On January 6, 2015, the Trustee passed away.

21 <sup>4</sup> Attached to the Annulment Motion are copies of two documents marked as Exhibit “1”  
22 and “2.” BOA does not object to the court’s consideration of the exhibits.

23 <sup>5</sup> Attached to the Combs Declaration are copies of various documents marked as Exhibits  
24 “A” through “Z.” Movants have raised no objections to the court’s consideration of the exhibits.

25 <sup>6</sup> On May 24, 2019, a request for special notice was filed by the law firm of Tiffany &  
26 Bosco, P.A., as attorneys for BOA, even though the Opposition was filed on behalf of BOA by a  
different law firm. (ECF No. 52).

27 <sup>7</sup> Attached to the Reply are copies of various documents marked as Exhibits “1” through  
28 “7.” The first two exhibits appear to be identical to those attached to the Annulment Motion.  
BOA has raised no objections to the court’s consideration of these exhibits.

1 relief from stay from the bankruptcy court and while the Residence was still property of the  
2 bankruptcy estate.

3 After the Chapter 7 case was closed, Madeira HOA completed its foreclosure sale. The  
4 Residence was purchased at the foreclosure sale by Vendange Place. A trustee's deed upon sale  
5 was recorded in the county records. Thereafter, the Residence was transferred to Paradise  
6 Harbor. A grant deed was recorded in the county records.

7 On March 2, 2016, BOA commenced a civil action in the United States District Court for  
8 the District of Nevada ("USDC") against Madeira HOA, Vendange Place, Paradise Harbor, and  
9 Nevada Association Services, denominated Case No. 16-cv-00444-APG-NJK ("Federal Case").<sup>8</sup>  
10 BOA's complaint ("Complaint") is framed as four separate causes of action, the first of which  
11 seeks quiet title and declaratory relief as to the ownership of the Residence ("Quiet Title  
12 Claim"), while the third seeks a determination that the foreclosure sale was wrongful ("Wrongful  
13 Foreclosure Claim"). The Quiet Title Claim asserts numerous grounds contesting the validity of  
14 the HOA foreclosure, only one of which involves the above-captioned bankruptcy proceeding.  
15 BOA argues that the HOA Foreclosure is void as a matter of law because it was commenced in  
16 violation of the automatic stay. The Wrongful Foreclosure Claim asserts numerous grounds  
17 challenging the foreclosure, including that BOA was never given adequate notice of the HOA  
18 Foreclosure proceeding.

19 On August 18, 2016, the USDC entered an order denying without prejudice Madeira  
20 HOA's motion to dismiss. The order also temporarily stayed further proceedings in the action  
21 pending the outcome of various appellate proceedings involving the Ninth Circuit's divided  
22 opinion in Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 832 F.3d 1159 (2016).

23 On September 21, 2018, the USDC entered an order lifting the stay of the civil action in  
24 light of certain rulings entered in connection with the Bourne Valley proceeding.

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26 <sup>8</sup> The court takes judicial notice under FRE 201 of the documents filed in the Federal  
27 Case. Compare U.S. v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980); Conde v. Open Door Mktg.,  
28 LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 949, 970 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Green v. Williams, 2012 WL 3962458, at  
\*1 n.1 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2012); Bank of Am., N.A. v. CD-04, Inc. (In re Owner Mgmt. Serv.,  
LLC Trustee Corps.), 530 B.R. 711, 717 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015).

1 On December 4, 2018, the USDC entered a scheduling order setting various deadlines for  
2 further proceedings, including the submission of a joint pretrial order no later than April 12,  
3 2019.

4 On March 13, 2019, in accordance with the scheduling order, various motions for  
5 summary judgment were filed.

6 On May 1, 2019, the instant Annulment Motion was filed before this bankruptcy court,  
7 after which the briefing on the summary judgment motions was completed in the USDC.

### 8 DISCUSSION

9 The automatic stay arises only upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition and is applicable  
10 to “all entities.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The automatic stay applies, *inter alia*, to any act to “obtain  
11 possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over  
12 property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The automatic stay also applies to any act to  
13 “enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). The stay of acts against  
14 property of the estate continues until the property is no longer property of the bankruptcy estate.  
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). Property of the estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the  
16 debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

17 When the Debtors filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Residence was property  
18 of the bankruptcy estate protected by the automatic stay. The relevant timeline for the instant  
19 dispute is as follows:

- 20 • September 1, 2010 - Debtors filed their Chapter 7 Petition.
  - 21 • December 7, 2010 - Debtors received their Chapter 7 discharge.
  - 22 • February 14, 2011 - Madeira HOA recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien  
23 (“NODAL”) (Combs Ex. “F”).
  - 24 • April 6, 2011 - Madeira HOA recorded a notice of default and election to sell  
25 (“NOD”) (Combs Ex. “H”).
- 26  
27  
28

- 1 • April 16, 2012 – Madeira HOA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale (“NOS”) (Combs Ex. “J”).<sup>9</sup>
- 2
- 3 • May 22, 2012 - Chapter 7 case was closed.
- 4 • June 8, 2012 – Foreclosure sale was completed (“HOA Foreclosure”).
- 5 • June 19, 2012 – Foreclosure deed was recorded in favor of Vendange Place. (Combs
- 6 Ex. “M”).<sup>10</sup>
- 7 • July 26, 2012 – Residence was deeded to Paradise Harbor. (Combs Ex. “N”).

8 There is no dispute that the Residence was property of the bankruptcy estate until the case was  
 9 closed and at no time did Madeira HOA seek or obtain relief from the automatic stay to enforce  
 10 its assessment lien. As a matter of law, the recording of the NODAL, NOD and NOS were *void*  
 11 *ab initio*, see Schwartz v. U. S. (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992), and the  
 12 foreclosure sale was a nullity. See, e.g., 40235 Washington St. Corp. v. Lusardi (In re 40235  
 13 Washington St. Corp.), 329 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (purchase of bankruptcy estate  
 14 property at county tax sale in violation of automatic stay was without effect). It appears that  
 15 Madeira HOA willfully violated the automatic stay under Section 362(a)(4) because it received  
 16 notice of the bankruptcy case and nonetheless proceeded with its foreclosure.<sup>11</sup>

17 \_\_\_\_\_  
 18 <sup>9</sup> According to the NOS, the total amount of the delinquent assessment and reasonable  
 19 estimated costs, expenses, and advances at the time of the initial publication of the notice of sale  
 was \$3,752.72.

20 <sup>10</sup> According to the foreclosure deed, Vendange Place acquired the Residence for a bid in  
 21 the amount of \$6,350.00. Less than two months after being deeded the Residence, Paradise  
 Harbor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 proceeding that was shortly dismissed. (Combs Ex. “S”).  
 22 During the Chapter 11 proceeding, Paradise Harbor represented at the Residence had a value of  
 \$190,000. (Combs Ex. “Q” and “R”).

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
 24 <sup>11</sup> The HOA involved in the present dispute is only one of many such entities that have  
 25 initiated foreclosure sales in violation of the automatic stay, which in turn have spawned costly  
 litigation between former lenders and subsequent owners of residential real property. See, e.g.,  
 26 In re Doris Barrett, Case No. 08-13570-MKN, Order Regarding Second Amended Motion for  
 Determination that HOA Foreclosure Sale Violated the Automatic Stay, and Counter-Motion to  
 27 Retroactively Annul the Stay, Docket No. 255 (Bankr.D.Nev. Mar. 25, 2019); In re Lum Lung,  
 2018 WL 6980928, at \*6 (Bankr. D.Nev. Dec. 6, 2018) (granting purchaser’s motion to annul  
 28 automatic stay to validate homeowners association foreclosure sale); In re Leeds, 589 B.R. 186,  
 195- 204 (Bankr. D.Nev. 2018) (denying purchaser’s motion to annul automatic stay where

1 Under Nevada law, certain portions of HOA assessment liens have priority over  
2 residential mortgages. See NRS 116.3116(2)(b). When the homeowner does not satisfy the  
3 priority lien, the HOA can enforce the priority assessment lien by foreclosing on the residence.  
4 The Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that a valid HOA foreclosure sale of residential  
5 property extinguishes the lower priority mortgage held by the residential lender. See SFR Inv.  
6 Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 419 (Nev. 2014).<sup>12</sup> In a bankruptcy context, the  
7 consequence to the residential lender is extreme: the individual debtor's personal liability for the  
8 loan is discharged by the bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 727(b), and the lender's security interest  
9 against the residence is extinguished by the foreclosure. See also Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350  
10 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mort., 388 P.3d 970, 973 (Nev. 2017). The residential lender  
11 ends up with no enforceable obligation against the borrower because of the discharge injunction,  
12 see 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1 and 2), and the purchaser at the HOA foreclosure sale ends up with title

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14  
15 purchaser at homeowners association foreclosure sale was a client of the Chapter 7 trustee); In re  
16 Lynn C. Burke, Case No. 12-12508-MKN, Order on Ex Parte Motion to Reopen Bankruptcy  
17 Case for the Purpose of Retroactively Annuling the Automatic Stay, Docket No. 45 (Bankr.  
18 D.Nev. Apr. 15, 2016) (granting purchaser's motion to annul automatic stay to validate HOA  
19 foreclosure sale); In re Victor H. Wheatley, Case No. 12-22310-MKN, Order on Motion for  
20 Relief from Stay re: 1304 Rawhide Street Las Vegas, Nevada, Docket No. 85 (Bankr. D.Nev.  
21 July 31, 2015) (granting homeowners association motion, joined by purchaser, to annul  
22 automatic stay to validate sale); In re Wayne Alan Haddad and Debra Ann Haddad, Case No. 11-  
23 13184-MKN, Order on Ex Parte Motion to Reopen Bankruptcy Case for the Purpose of  
24 Retroactively Annuling the Automatic Stay, Docket No. 36 (Bankr. D.Nev. May 19, 2015)  
25 (granting purchaser's motion to annul automatic stay to validate homeowners association  
foreclosure sale and overruling objection by debtors as to the impact of reopening on their credit  
history). Under Section 362(k)(1), an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic  
stay is entitled to recover actual damages, including attorney's fees, as well as punitive damages  
in appropriate circumstances. As yet, the court is not aware of any instance where an individual  
injured as a result of a violation of the automatic stay by an HOA has sought and/or obtained  
damages from an HOA under Section 362(k)(1). But see In re Leeds, 589 B.R. at 204 n.30.

26 <sup>12</sup> The residential lender can prevent an HOA foreclosure sale from being completed by  
27 making an unconditional tender of payment of the priority portion of the HOA assessment lien  
28 before the foreclosure sale is held. See Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC,  
427 P.3d 113, 117-18 (Nev. 2018).

1 to the residence unencumbered by the prior mortgage by paying a fraction of the fair market  
2 value of the residence.

3 Also, as mentioned above, the Quiet Title Claim now alleged in the Federal Case seeks a  
4 declaration that the HOA Foreclosure was void for several reasons, including: (1) that the  
5 underlying Nevada foreclosure statute is unconstitutional,<sup>13</sup> and (2) that the HOA Foreclosure  
6 was conducted in violation of the automatic stay. While the summary judgment motions are  
7 pending before the USDC in the Federal Case, Movants have brought this Annulment Motion  
8 before the bankruptcy court to address the automatic stay aspect of the Quiet Title Claim.

9 Where the automatic stay has been violated, a party in interest may seek an order from  
10 the bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay for “cause” under Section 362(d)(1). See  
11 Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 572-73.<sup>14</sup> Annulment of the automatic stay “has the effect of retroactively  
12 validating acts that otherwise violate the stay.” Lonestar Sec. & Video, Inc., v. Gurrola (In re  
13 Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 172 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). See, e.g., Ceralde v. The Bank of N.Y.  
14 Mellon (In re Ceralde), 2013 WL 4007861 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013) (annulment motion  
15 granted in involuntary Chapter 7 case in favor of lender that foreclosed without prior knowledge  
16

17 <sup>13</sup> The constitutionality of the Nevada foreclosure statute applicable to homeowners  
18 associations has been addressed in both state and federal courts in Nevada. In Bank of America,  
19 N.A. v. Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Association, 920 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2019), the  
20 Ninth Circuit recently reversed the USDC and upheld the constitutionality of the statute based on  
21 the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1,  
22 LLC. On remand, the USDC granted summary judgment in favor of the lender because there  
23 was no genuine dispute that the lender had unconditionally tendered the superpriority portion of  
24 the homeowner association’s assessment lien before the foreclosure sale was held. See Bank of  
25 America, N.A. v. Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Association, 2019 WL 2250265, at \* 5  
26 (D.Nev. May 24, 2019).

27 <sup>14</sup> The automatic stay under Section 362(a) is not limited to creditors of the debtor but is  
28 “applicable to all entities.” An “entity” under Section 101(15) includes any person, estate, trust,  
governmental unit, and the United States trustee.” A “person” under Section 101(41) includes an  
“individual, partnership, and corporation.” Relief from stay under Section 362(d) also is not  
limited to creditors of the debtor but may be sought by any “party in interest.” Because  
Vendange Place and Paradise Harbor are persons and therefore are parties in interest to which  
the automatic stay applies, they are permitted under Section 362(d) to seek relief from stay in this  
bankruptcy case.



1 of involuntary proceeding). See also, Sundquist v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Sundquist), 566  
2 B.R. 563, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2017).

3 In this case, neither BOA nor the Movants are parties to the Chapter 7 proceedings that  
4 the automatic stay is designed to protect, i.e., the Debtors and their assigned bankruptcy trustee.  
5 In this circuit, however, a party asserting an ownership interest in property of a bankruptcy estate  
6 does have standing as a party in interest to seek annulment of the automatic stay. See In re  
7 McKay, 2019 WL 642834, at \*6 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 14, 2019), citing Cruz v. Stein Strauss  
8 Trust # 1361, PDQ Invs., LLC (In re Cruz), 516 B.R. 594, 602 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014); In re Lum  
9 Lung, 2018 WL 6980928, at \*3 n.5. By contrast, in this circuit, a creditor of a bankruptcy estate  
10 does not have standing to object to annulment of the automatic stay. See In re Leeds, 589 B.R. at  
11 198-200, citing Tilley v. Vucurevich (In re Pecan Groves of Arizona), 951 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.  
12 1991).<sup>15</sup> BOA therefore has no standing to respond to the Annulment Motion and this  
13 bankruptcy court is not required to consider BOA's objections to the requested relief.  
14 Nonetheless, the court separately considers if the retroactive relief requested is appropriate based  
15 on the facts presented.

16 Whether "cause" exists under Section 362(d)(1) to annul the stay is determined under a  
17 "balancing of the equities" test. See In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. 12, 24 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003). The  
18 following factors should be considered:

- 19 1. Number of filings;
- 20 2. Whether, in a repeat filing case, the circumstances indicate an intention to  
21 delay and hinder creditors;
- 22 3. A weighing of the extent of prejudice to creditors or third parties if the  
23 stay relief is not made retroactive, including whether harm exists to a bona  
24 fide purchaser;

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25 <sup>15</sup> Although this bankruptcy court has expressed a different view that the automatic stay  
26 also protects creditors, see In re Leeds, 589 B.R. at 200 n.22, the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated  
27 its view in Pecan Groves that the only parties with standing to object to retroactive relief from  
28 stay are the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1,  
LLC (In re Petrone), 2019 WL 911869, at \*1-2 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2019). This court is, of course,  
bound by the views of the Ninth Circuit.

- 1 4. The Debtor's overall good faith (totality of circumstances test): *cf. Fid. &*  
2 *Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren)*, 89 B.R. 87, 93 (9th Cir. BAP  
3 1988)(chapter 13 good faith);
- 4 5. Whether creditors knew of stay but nonetheless took action, thus  
5 compounding the problem;
- 6 6. Whether the debtor has complied, and is otherwise complying, with the  
7 Bankruptcy Code and Rules;
- 8 7. The relative ease of restoring parties to the *status quo ante*;
- 9 8. The costs of annulment to debtors and creditors;
- 10 9. How quickly creditors moved for annulment, or how quickly debtors  
11 moved to set aside the sale or violative conduct;
- 12 10. Whether, after learning of the bankruptcy, creditors proceeded to take  
13 steps in continued violation of the stay, or whether they moved  
14 expeditiously to gain relief;
- 15 11. Whether annulment of the stay will cause irreparable injury to the  
16 debtor;
- 17 12. Whether stay relief will promote judicial economy or other efficiencies.

18 Id. at 25.<sup>16</sup>

19 Five of these factors (1, 2, 4, 6, and 11) focus solely on the debtor (“debtor factors”);  
20 three of these factors (3, 5, and 10) focus solely on non-debtors (“non-debtor factors”); three of  
21 these factors (7, 8, and 9) focus on both the debtor and non-debtor parties (“common factors”);  
22 and one factor (12) looks to judicial interests (“neutral factor”). All twelve factors (“Fjeldsted  
23 Factors”) simply provide an analytical framework and any one factor may be dispositive in  
24 comparison to the others. Id. Thus, determining whether annulment is proper is made on a case  
25 by case basis. See Nat’l Envt’l. Waste Corp. v. City of Riverside (In re Nat’l Envt’l. Waste  
26 Corp.), 129 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1997).<sup>17</sup>

27 <sup>16</sup> Factor 5 refers to the Warren decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth  
28 Circuit (“BAP”). In that proceeding, the individual debtor sought to discharge a \$40,970  
embezzlement judgment through a Chapter 13 plan that paid only \$1,000 to his creditors. The  
embezzlement judgment would have been nondischargeable in Chapter 7 under Section  
523(a)(6), but was not excepted from the so-called “super-discharge” in Chapter 13 under then-  
Section 1328(c). 89 B.R. at 93. The BAP determined that a finding of the debtor’s good faith in  
proposing a plan under Section 1325(a)(3) should take into consideration the amount of the  
proposed payment to creditors and the presence of a debt that would be nondischargeable in  
Chapter 7. Id. at 95.

<sup>17</sup> The parties to the instant dispute correctly refer to the Fjeldsted Factors, see  
Annulment Motion at 4:19 to 7:15, Opposition at 14:6 to 18:5, and Reply at 10:8 to 13:26, but, of  
course, reach opposite conclusions.

1 In this instance, the previously categorized debtor factors favor retroactive relief from  
2 stay. Debtors do not have a history of repeat bankruptcy filings that might suggest a malign  
3 intent to delay or hinder creditors. Debtors obtained their Chapter 7 discharge by complying  
4 with the applicable requirements of bankruptcy law, and no party in interest has questioned their  
5 good faith. More important, rather than causing irreparable injury to the Debtors, it appears that  
6 retroactive relief from stay will prevent them from losing the benefit of their bankruptcy  
7 discharge. If the HOA Foreclosure sale was void and title to the Residence did not pass to  
8 Vendange Place, then title remains in the Debtors' names and in their bankruptcy estate. When  
9 they filed their bankruptcy petition, neither sought to reside in the Residence and they did not  
10 claim it as their homestead. Both Debtors stated their intention to surrender the Residence.  
11 Because the Debtors have made no payments on the underlying obligation for approximately a  
12 decade, they would be subject to a renewed foreclosure of the Residence occurring well after  
13 they received their Chapter 7 discharge. The post-discharge damage to the Debtors' new credit  
14 history is likely to be significant and certainly detrimental to their fresh start through Chapter 7.

15 The non-debtor factors also favor retroactive relief. There is no suggestion in the record  
16 that the Movants had notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case, or knew that the HOA  
17 Foreclosure sale was in violation of the automatic stay. In fact, the record demonstrates that  
18 Vendange Place was never listed as a creditor or interested party in the bankruptcy proceedings  
19 at any time. Thus, the evidence in the record infers that Vendange Place did not know of the  
20 automatic stay and did not take steps to continually violate the stay. Moreover, both Movants  
21 sought retroactive relief from stay soon after BOA resumed prosecution of the Federal Case  
22 where it asserted the protection of the automatic stay. Because Vendange Place apparently was a  
23 bona fide purchaser of the Residence, the prejudice to its successor in interest was greater than  
24 that of a lender who would have had an opportunity to tender payment of any delinquent HOA  
25 assessments to prevent a foreclosure sale. See discussion at note 12, supra. See also SFR Inv.  
26 Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 414 (Nev. 2014) ("But as a junior lienholder, U.S.  
27 Bank could have paid off the SHHOA lien to avert loss of its security...The inequity U.S. Bank  
28

1 decries is thus of its own making...”).<sup>18</sup> While the non-debtor factors do not favor Madeira  
2 HOA, they do support retroactive relief in favor of the Movants.<sup>19</sup>

3 The common factors also support retroactive relief from stay. As already discussed, if  
4 the foreclosure sale is void, legal title to the Residence never left the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate.  
5 Restoration of the “status quo ante,” however, means not only that legal title to the Residence  
6 remains in the Debtors, but that Madeira HOA would have an unpaid priority assessment lien,  
7 the Debtors would be in substantial default on the loan, and BOA’s deed of trust against the  
8 Residence would be restored.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, Paradise Harbor would have no legal interest in  
9 the Residence and Vendange Place would be out the \$6,350 that it paid at the foreclosure sale.  
10 Even if the \$6,350 paid by Vendange Place is ignored, there will be difficulty restoring the real  
11 property records to reflect the state of title to the Residence that existed prior to the June 8, 2012  
12 foreclosure. The other common factors are immaterial.

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15 <sup>18</sup> BOA asserts that the HOA Foreclosure was conducted without giving proper notice,  
16 see Opposition at 14:10-23, which also is alleged in the Wrongful Foreclosure Claim that is  
17 being litigated before the USDC in the Federal Case. See discussion at 4, supra. Whether the  
18 assertion will be resolved through the summary judgment motions pending in that proceeding is  
19 unknown. For purposes of this Annulment Motion, however, the court determines only whether  
20 retroactive relief from stay is warranted. Like all relief from stay motions seeking permission to  
21 conduct foreclosures outside of bankruptcy, the court does not address whether the foreclosure  
22 itself is properly conducted under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

21 <sup>19</sup> The windfall obtained by Vendange Place in this case, see note 10, supra, should not be  
22 lost on anyone to this dispute. That windfall, however, is the result of the Nevada statutory  
23 scheme that provides extraordinary tools for HOAs to collect assessments required to protect and  
24 serve common community needs. Residential lenders can protect their interests, however, by  
25 pursuing remedies under their deeds of trust, or, by unconditionally tendering payment of any  
26 delinquent assessments to the HOA. See, e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC  
27 Series VII, 435 P.3d 1217 (Nev. 2019) (HOA statement of rejection of super priority tender, if  
28 attempted, operated to cure any default).

26 <sup>20</sup> The “status quo ante” is a term of art referring to the conditions that existed before the  
27 challenged action took place. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.Ct. 973, 985-  
28 86 (2017) (structured Chapter 11 dismissal did not restore status quo ante, but distributed  
debtor’s assets in violation of bankruptcy priority scheme).

1 The remaining “neutral factor” also favors retroactive relief. This is a Chapter 7 case that  
2 was reopened for the limited purpose of allowing the Annulment Motion to be pursued. There  
3 are no other pertinent proceedings in this bankruptcy court involving the parties to this matter  
4 and the Federal Case is currently pending before the USDC. Debtors have been given notice of  
5 the retroactive relief from stay requested by the Movants and have not filed or presented any  
6 opposition to such relief. Moreover, notice of the relief requested by the Movants also has been  
7 given to the UST which also does not oppose, nor has the UST taken steps to appoint another  
8 Chapter 7 trustee to respond to the Annulment Motion. On the other hand, the Federal Case  
9 remains before the USDC where other controversies may be litigated between the Movants and  
10 BOA, including any remaining issues as to the validity of the Nevada HOA foreclosure statute.  
11 Judicial economy supports allowing the parties to return to the USDC to resolve those issues, if  
12 any.

13 Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the Fjeldsted factors taken as a whole - the  
14 debtor, non-debtor, creditor, and neutral factors – favor retroactive relief from stay for cause  
15 under Section 362(d)(1). The court concludes that the automatic stay that arose on September 1,  
16 2010, should be annulled to include all steps necessary after the commencement date to complete  
17 the HOA Foreclosure sale of the Residence.<sup>21</sup>

18 **IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that Paradise Harbor Place Trust and Vendange Place  
19 Trust’s Motion to Retroactively Annul the Automatic Stay, Docket No. 26, be, and the same  
20 hereby is, **GRANTED**, effective February 14, 2011.

21 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the clerk of the court shall re-closed the above-  
22 captioned bankruptcy case on June 28, 2019.

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24 <sup>21</sup> In its written opposition, and at oral argument, BOA suggested that the court could  
25 somehow annul the automatic stay so that the HOA Foreclosure applied only to the non-priority  
26 portion of the assessment lien. See Opposition at 18:6-8. Such relief would bypass the effect of  
27 the Nevada HOA foreclosure statute, and would make the Movants’ title to the Residence subject  
28 to BOA’s previous note and deed of trust. While that solution might avoid some of the  
ramifications to the Debtors, it would be the equivalent of a legal windfall to BOA. This  
suggestion is both startlingly self-serving and an apparent effort to render moot much of the  
litigation that BOA itself initiated in its Federal Case.

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